In this paper, we propose two new generic attacks on the rank syndrome decoding (RSD) problem. Let C be a random [n, k] rank code over G F(q m ) and let y = x + e be a received word, such that x ∈ C and rank(e) = r. The first attack, the support attack, is combinatorial and permits to recover an error e of rank weight r in min(O((n − k) 3 m 3 q r (km/n) , O((n − k) 3 m 3 q (r−1) (((k+1)m)/n) )) operations on G F(q). This new attack improves the exponent for the best generic attack for the RSD problem in the case n > m, by introducing the ratio m/n in the exponential coefficient of the previously best known attacks. The second attack, the annulator polynomial attack, is an algebraic attack based on the theory of q-polynomials introduced by Ore. We propose a new algebraic setting for the RSD problem that permits to consider equations and unknowns in the extension field G F(q m ) rather than in G F(q) as it is usually the case. We consider two approaches to solve the problem in this new setting. The linearization technique shows that if n ≥ (k + 1) (r + 1) − 1 the RSD problem can be solved in polynomial time. More generally, we prove that if (((r + 1)(k + 1)− (n + 1))/r) ≤ k, the RSD problem can be solved with an average complexity of O(r 3 k 3 q r (((r+1)(k+1)−(n+1))/ r) ) operations in the base field G F(q). We also consider solving with Gröbner bases for which we discuss theoretical complexity, we also consider hybrid solving with Gröbner bases on practical parameters. As an example of application, we use our new attacks on all recent cryptosystems parameters, which repair the GPT cryptosystem, we break all examples of published proposed parameters, and some parameters are broken in less than 1 s in certain cases.
is the analogous for rank metric of the Syndrome Decoding problem for Hamming distance. Concerning cryptography, Gabidulin et al. proposed a few years later in [25] a cryptosystem (GPT) analogous to the McEliece cryptosystem for Hamming distance but with Gabidulin codes and for rank metric. One of the advantage of rank metric is that the complexity of the best known attacks for solving the RSD problem have an exponential complexity which is quadratic in the parameters of the system. For C a [n, k] code over G F(q m ) that one wants to decode for an error of rank r , the 1996 attack by Chabaud and Stern [13] has an exponential term in q (m−r)(r −1) and the 2003 attack by Ourivski and Johansson [37] has an exponential term in q (k+1)(r −1) . It means that in practice it is possible to choose parameters such that the best known attacks have a high complexity (2 80 for instance), when the size in bits of the description of the generic RSD problem remains reasonable (of order a few thousand bits). This point is interesting since obtaining an equivalent complexity for a random instance of the syndrome decoding problem for Hamming distance would necessitate matrices with size several hundred thousand bits.
Because of the strong structure of Gabidulin codes, the GPT cryptosystem has been the object of several structural attacks over the years. Several variations [24] for hiding the structure of the Gabidulin codes, like the Rank Reducible codes, have been proposed, with always public keys size of order 10 kilo bits. Besides the GPT system, Faure and Loidreau [20] proposed a cryptosystem also relying on the Gabidulin codes but different from the GPT approach. Very recently a new cryptosystem based on Low Rank Parity Check code (LRPC), a rank equivalent of LDPC codes, was proposed in [26] . The LRPC cryptosystem is in the spirit of the NTRU cryptosystem [30] and of the MDPC codes [35] . The LRPC codes can also be used for signature [27] . At last public key zero-knowledge authentication schemes relying directly on random instances of RSD and with very small public keys have been proposed like [14] or very recently [29] .
In 2005 Overbeck proposed a new structural attack [38] , [39] , which permits to recover the structure of Gabidulin codes when hidden in different forms. His attack broke all proposed parameters (at that time) of cryptosystems based on hiding the Gabidulin codes. A few years later, new parameters were proposed [32] , [40] , which resist the attack by Overbeck. Meanwhile besides the Overbeck attack, which is a structural attack only related to Gabidulin codes, the practical complexity of the generic RSD problem has not evolved for more than 10 years. In particular when looking at the 0018-9448 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. exponential complexity of [13] and [37] , it is striking that the exponential term does not depend on the length the code. Besides these combinatorial attacks, an algebraic approach was also proposed in [31] but with limited results as soon as r was greater than 2 or 3, eventually the case n = m is indirectly considered in [17] . Overall the RSD problem appears to be a cryptographic problem with a strong potential which seems to be under exploited.
Our Contribution: In this paper we consider the complexity of solving the generic RSD problem, we propose two new approaches, the first approach is combinatorial and generalizes a particular Hamming distance attack based on the error support in a rank metric context. Our attack can be seen as a generalization of both [13] and [37] and permits to include the length of the code in the exponential term of the complexity of [37] . For the second approach we introduce a new algebraic setting for solving the RSD problem, our new setting relies on annulator polynomials obtained from q-polynomials (or linearized polynomials) introduced by Ore and minimizes the number of unknowns by giving an algebraic setting in the extension field G F(q m ) rather than in G F(q) as it is the case in general. We consider several ways to solve the problem in this setting: an hybrid generalization approach and a, hybrid solving with Gröbner bases. We apply our attack and break all reparation of the GPT cryptosystem proposed after the Overbeck attack. In practice for considered parameters algebraic attacks based on the new annulator polynomial setting give the best results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls basic facts on rank codes, Section 3 recalls previous attacks, Section 4 explains our new attack based on error support, Section 5 introduces the new algebraic setting based on annulator polynomials, Section 6 proposes a solving of the setting with linearization, Section 7 considers solving with Gröbner basis and at last Section 8 deals with application of the attacks to specific cryptosystems parameters.
II. BACKGROUND ON RANK METRIC, RANK CODES AND ALGEBRAIC SYSTEMS

A. Notation and Definition of Rank Distance Codes
In this subsection, we introduce notions used hereafter and we define rank codes: codes for rank distance. Let q be a power of a prime p, m and n ∈ N some integers and let V n be a n dimensional vector space over GF (q m ). Set B = {b 1 , . . . , b m } a basis of GF (q m ) over GF (q) such that way that for all x ∈ GF (q m ) we have x = m i=1 x i b i . Ifv = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ V n then, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we
v j,i b j andv can be interpreted as a matrix v i, j i, j ∈ M m×n (GF (q)). We define the rank weight of an elementv ∈ V n as the rank of the associated matrix v i, j i, j denoted rank (v). Ifv andw ∈ V n , we define d r (v,w) = rank (v −w). The function d r is a distance over V n and is called the rank distance.
Definition 1:
A rank code C of length n and dimension k over GF (q m ) is a subspace of dimension k of GF (q m ) n equipped with the rank metric.
Definition 2: The minimum rank distance of the code C is the minimum rank (rank distance to zero) of a non-zero element of C.
There exist many similar notions between Hamming based codes and rank codes, since only the metric changes. Some notions are clearly identical, like for instance the notion of parity check matrix, which is a dual matrix of a generator matrix of a code for the usual scalar product. Meanwhile some notions are different: of particular interest is the notion of support. For Hamming distance the support of a codeword x = (x 1 , ..., x n ), is the set of coordinates such that x i = 0. The same notion could be considered in the same way for rank metric, but it turns out that the following support notion is more adapted for rank metric:
Definition 3: Let x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) be an element of G F(q m ) n , we denote by supp(x), the support of x: the G F(q)-vector space of G F(q m ) generated by the coordinates
Obviously the dimension of the support of x is the rank of x. This generalized notion of support for rank metric makes sense regarding the notion of support for Hamming distance, in the sense that in both cases: if the support of a word is known and if one is given a syndrome s = H.x t then it is possible to recover the coordinates of x, if there are sufficiently many syndrome equations, by simply solving a linear system.
Gaussian Binomial and Newton Binomial: An important tool for Hamming distance is the Newton binomial n t which counts the number of words of G F(2) n of weight t, the number of supports of size t. The equivalent tool for counting the number of support of given dimension r corresponds to counting the number of subspaces of dimension r of a vector space G F(q m ) (as a G F(q)-vector space). This number is exactly defined by the Gaussian binomial.
Definition 4: The Gaussian binomial over G F(q) is defined as:
The classical approximation of the Gaussian binomial gives: m r q ≈ q (m−r)r . We will see in the following that the Gaussian binomial plays the same role for attacks in rank metric, than the Newton binomial for Hamming distance. Now an interesting property of the Gaussian binomial is that its value is exponential with a quadratic term, when the value of the Newton binomial is bounded above by 2 n for any t. This difference explains the difference of size of keys between cryptosystems for Hamming and rank metric.
B. Hard Problems for Rank Metric
The two main problems which are used for cryptography based on codes with Hamming distance are the classical Syndrome Decoding problem (SD) and Minimum Distance problem (MD), which were respectively proven NP-hard, in 1978 by Berlekamp et al. for the SD problem and in 1997 by Vardy [43] for MD problem. The two previous problems can be straightforwardly generalized in a rank distance context in the following way:
Rank Syndrome Decoding Problem (RSD): Instance: a (n−k)×n matrix H over G F(q m ), a syndrome s in G F(q m ) n−k and an integer w Question: does there exist x ∈ G F(q m ) n such that H.x t = s and w R (x) ≤ w ?
and Rank Minimum Distance Problem (RMD): Instance: a rank code C[n, k], an integer w,
In that case, although problems related to rank metric have been used for cryptography since 1991 (the GPT cryptosystem [25] ), their hardness remained an open question since. This question was eventually recently solved positively in [28] where a randomized reduction of the SD problem to the RSD problem is given (respectively from the MD problem to the RMD problem), see [28] for details. Notice also that, as in the case of Hamming distance, the Rank Syndrome Decoding problem is equivalent to the problem of recovering the error vector e in a received word y = x G + e for G a generator matrix of a rank code, indeed, if we denote by H an associated dual matrix of G, then recovering e, is equivalent to solve:
C. Polynomial Solving
Some attacks proposed here consist in reducing the RSD problem to solving a polynomial system. Let us, now, introduce the problem of solving polynomial systems:
Problem: Polynomial System Solving (PoSSo): Instance: let K be a field and f 1 (
We will use two main methods to solve this problem: linearization (when we have enough equations) and Gröbner bases introduced by Buchberger in [7] (this is a general approach). It is well known that PoSSo problem is NP-hard even if all the f i have degree 2 (in this case the problem is called MQ for multivariate quadratic). Gröbner basis is a systematic tool to solve the PoSSo problem. When such a system has a finite number of solutions, it is said to be zerodimensional. We will only consider zero-dimensional systems here since the roots coordinates are in a finite field and the field equations on each variable form a zero-dimensional system by itself.
III. PREVIOUS WORKS FOR SOLVING THE RSD PROBLEM
There are two types of attacks on the RSD problem: combinatorial attacks and algebraic attacks. Combinatorial attacks consider the properties of the rank metric on a combinatorial point of view in order to recover either the support or the coordinates of the error vector. Algebraic attacks aim at characterizing the notion of rank through algebraic settings. Equations are then derived from the algebraic setting and the attacker tries to solve these equations through classical solving tools like Grobner basis. These two types of attacks lead to different approaches, in the following we sum up previous works on these type of attacks.
A. Previous Works for Combinatorial Attacks
There were 3 different combinatorial attacks on the syndrome decoding problem in rank metric. The first attack was proposed by Chabaud and Stern in 1996 [13] and the 2 others were proposed by Ourivski and Johannson in 2003 in [37] .
1) Problem Expression: The problem is to find a word e of G F(q m ) n such that rank(e) = r and H e T = s with H a matrix n − k × n and s a syndrome of lenght n − k. The error e can be reformulated as e = β E, for β a basis of the support of the error e, considered as a vector of length r β = (β 1 , . . . , β r ), and E a matrix of size r × n over G F(q). Equivalently, writing each coordinate of β in a basis B of G F(q m ) over G F(q), the vector β can also be seen as a m × r matrix over G F(q).
2) The Chabaud-Stern Attack (Basis Enumeration): The idea of the attack is to enumerate the differents possible basis β of r vectors and then solve the linear system resulting, for each basis enumerated. Indeed, the problem H E T β T = s is quadratic and becomes linear if β is known.
A brute force algorithm gives an enumeration in q rm operations by testing all the representations of the basis. The complexity of the attack can be reduced by testing only one representation of each basis to enumerate. The complexity of the enumeration becomes q (m−r)(r−1) and the complexity of solving the linear system (nr + m) 3 . The full complexity is hence (nr + m) 3 q (m−r)(r−1) operations in G F(q m ).
3) An Improvement by Ourivski and Johannsson: One of the two attacks proposed in [37] by Ourivski and Johannson is a polynomial improvement of the previous Chabaud-Stern attack. The improvement consists in decreasing the complexity of solving the linear system in each enumeration. The idea is to reformulate the problem H e T = s with its dual form x G + e = y with G the dual matrix of H , y a public value and x and e the unknowns. The new complexity of this attack
4) A Second Attack by Ourivski and Johansson (Coordinates Enumeration):
This last attack was also proposed in [37] . This attack uses the same formulation as previous attacks: H E T β T = s. This time the idea is to enumerate all matrices E instead of the vector β before solving the linear system. The complexity of the attack is (k + r ) 3 r 3 q (r−1)(k+1) .
B. Algebraic Attacks
The main challenge for algebraic attacks is how find an efficient way to translate the notion of rank into an algebraic setting. There exist two approaches to deal with this, and in this paper we add a third one. The first approach considers directly the RSD problem and was introduced by Levy-dit-Vehel and Perret in [31] , the second approach considers a narrow problem: the MinRank problem to which the Rank Syndrome Decoding problem can be reduced, but in practice this last type of algebraic setting seems really adapted for certain type of MinRank parameters and not for usual parameters used with rank codes based cryptography.
1) The Levy-Perret Algebraic Attack for the RSD Problem: The attack described in the following is the only previous algebraic attack designed specifically for (RSD) problem. It was proposed by Levy-dit-Vehel and Perret in [31] . It generates a polynomial system following the original idea of Ourivski and Johansson. We describe a little more accurately the proposed attack in order to compare to the approach proposed in the present work. Starting from the dual problem y = x G + e where y ∈ G F(q m ) n is a public data (or the received word), e ∈ G F(q m ) n is the error (of rank r ), G the dual matrix of H and x ∈ G F(q m ) k , we have:
where I k is the k × k identity matrix. The code admitting G e = G y as generator matrix has the words e (for ∈ G F(q m ) − {0}) as subset of words of rank r . So the problem is reduced to finding a word of rank r in a linear code. The systematic form of G e is G s :
. At this point, we reduced the problem to the search of e 1 ∈ G F(q m ) k+1 such that rank(e 1 ) ≤ r and rank (e 1 e 1 R) = r . As for basis enumeration, one can write that e = E β where E = (E 1 , . . . , E r ) where E 1 , . . . , E r are independent elements of G F(q m ) over G F(q) and β = (β i, j ) is a r × n full rank matrix with coefficients lying in G F(q). We can decompose β = (β 1 β 2 ) where β 1 has size r × (k + 1) and β 2 has size r × (n − k − 1). Since it is enough to get e for any , we can set E 1 = 1. We get a system of n − k − 1 equations in nr + r − 1 unknowns, namely β i, j and E 2 , . . . , E r ∈ G F(q m ). On can choose a basis = {ω 1 , . . . , ω m } of G F(q m ) over G F(q) and this last system leads to a new system of m(n − k − 1) equations in nr + m(r − 1) unknowns over G F(q). This is the system attacked by Ourivski and Johansson. Levy-dit-Vehel and Perret consider this last system and the syndrome system H (Eβ) T = H y T together, written in the basis . This way, we find m(2(n − k) − 1) equations in nr + m(r − 1) unknowns over G F(q). This system is of full rank on average.
The system obtained this way is a quadratic system, but the complexity of solving it, is hard to evaluate. One can try to apply the complexity results of [11] exposed later in this paper under assumption that the system behave as a semiregular system, but the complexity bounds obtained are too huge to be considered for practical computations and do not fit with experiments.
2) MinRank and Induced Attacks: Buss et al. introduced MinRank problem in [8] and show that this is an NP-hard problem. This problem can be described as follows:
Problem: Let K be a field, consider a positive integers N, n, k, r and matrices M 0 ,
The RSD problem can be seen as a structured MinRank problem since in the case of rank codes, the codes are linear over the large field G F(q m ) and not only on the small field G F(q) like for the MinRank problem.
In [17] , Levy-dit-Vehel et al. reduced the rank decoding problem to the MinRank problem:
Proposition 5: A rank decoding problem of parameters (m, n, k, r )
can be reduced to MinRank problem of parameter (m, n, mk, r ).
In [17] , the authors propose a analysis of the Kipnis-Shamir attack for MinRank problem. Since the matrix
has rank at most r , its kernel E λ has dimension at least n − r . It is to say that there exists at least n − r independent vectors in E λ . To describe n − r independent vectors v 1 , . . . , v n−r , fixing arbitrarily the first
Writing that:
we obtain a system of n (n − r ) equations in r (n − r ) + k unknowns. We denote by I KS the ideal generated by these equations. Using the structure of this algebraic systems, the authors were able to give some bounds on the complexity of the attack in some very particular cases. First the authors always reduce the problem to the "square" case where m = n.
The author consider the case where s = n − r is fixed and parameters of the MinRank problem are n, n, s 2 , n − s . With these parameters, they have ns equations with rs+s 2 equations and they estimate the complexity of solving MinRank using fast Gröbner basis to O ln (q) n 3s 2 . Previously to [17] and still for the case n = m, Courtois and Goubin [10] gave an attack called kernel attack with complexity O q k n r k 3 with no constraints on n − r .
Another approach is proposed in [18] and [19] , the authors consider minors of matrix and use the fact that if a matrix has rank r then all (r + 1) × (r + 1) minors are null, they derive multivariate equations of degree r + 1. They consider the special cases k = (n − r ) 2 , n − r . They study the complexity of their approach, the complexity given is bounded by O(n ω(n−r) 2 ), which is exponential in (n − r ) 2 , which means that this approach as the previous kernel approach is especially interesting for the cases when n − r is small, hence r rather large. This type of parameters corresponds to certain parameters developed in [9] for the MinRank problem, but do not usually corresponds to parameters used for rank codes based cryptography and present less interest for the problems we study. Overall concerning algebraic attack, the most efficient approach seems to be the Levy-Perret approach, other attacks based on the MinRank problem seems less interesting except for very peculiar parameters, which makes sense since attacking the RSD problem through the MinRank problem does not use the extra structure induced by the linearity on the large field G F(q m ).
IV. A NEW COMBINATORIAL ATTACK: THE SUPPORT ATTACK
A. Background on Information Set Decoding for Hamming Distance
The best algorithms for decoding general random codes for Hamming distance is the information set decoding approach [21] . This method can be considered in two different ways. Consider for instance G a generator matrix of a [n, k] (binary) code and let H be a parity check matrix of the code spanned by the matrix G.
The first original approach starts from the received word y = x G + e and consists in guessing a set of k coordinates of y with no error (an information set), once such a set is found with a probability
, a linear inversion of a k × k matrix permits to recover x. This is what is done in some sense for rank codes by Ourivski and Johansson in [37] . Another approach for Hamming distance consists in starting from the syndrome H.y T of length n − k of the received vector. The basic idea of the decoding algorithm consists in guessing a set of n − k coordinates which contains the support of the error e of Hamming weight t, it can be obtained with probability
. Then since one gets n − k equations from the syndrome equations and a set of n − k coordinates containing the error support, it is possible to recover the error e by a (n − k) × (n − k) matrix inversion from the syndrome of the message.
It turns out that because of the properties of binomial coefficients, the two previous probabilities are equal and hence lead to the same exponential complexity for these two approaches (only in their simple form though -see recent improvements [3] , [6] , [21] , [34] ). Meanwhile one can remark that, although these attack are both considered as 'information set decoding', the second approach is not really connected with the notion of information set, but rather with the notion of error support.
We want to generalize the latter error support approach in the case of rank codes. We will see that at the difference of Hamming distance, for rank distance these two approaches lead to different exponential complexities and that the error support approach leads in general to a better complexity than the information set approach (corresponding to the Ourivski-Johansson approach).
B. Error Support Attack
Let C be a [n, k] random code over G F(q m ) with generator matrix G of size k × n and H a (n − k) × n parity check matrix of C. Suppose one wants to solve the RSD problem H.e T = s with rank(e) = r . The general idea we use for the support attack follows the general idea described for Hamming distance in the previous section: we want to find constraints on a subspace E , such that if E contains the support E of the error e, then it is possible to recover the coordinates of the error e by solving a linear system. Of course the larger the dimension of E is, the higher is the probability that a random E contains E.
The previous idea permits to obtain the following theorem: Theorem 6: Let C be a [n, k] random code over G F(q m ) with generator matrix G of size k × n and H a (n − k) × n parity check matrix of C. Suppose one wants to solve the RSD problem H.e T = s with rank(e) = r (or equivalently that we want to recover a codeword c of C from y = c + e). Let E be a subspace of dimension r , containing the error support E of dimension r , then recovering the error space E reduces to solving a linear system S with r n unknowns and (n − k)m equations. Assuming that S is of full rank, then one can recover e with an average complexity:
with generator matrix G of size k × n and suppose one receives y = c + e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r , in particular there exists a subspace E of dimension r (the support of the error e) which contains all the errors coordinates e i . Let now H be a parity check matrix of C, then one gets H.e T = H.y T . Suppose now, one knows a subspace E of dimension r which contains E, then for all
Writing the e i in terms of unknowns β i j over G F(q) as in (1) and considering the syndrome equations H.e T = H.y T , gives (n − k)m equations over the small field, the number of unknowns derived from the β i j is r n. Hence, assuming that the induced linear system on the base field G F(q) is of full rank (which happens with a strong probability since G is considered random), it is possible to recover the β i j (and therefore the e i ) by solving a linear system, as long as r n ≤ (n − k)m, and hence : r ≤ (n − k)m n (for a : floor of a (the integer part of a)).
We now want to compute the probability p that a random space of dimension r in a space of dimension m contains a given space of dimension r . This probability can be obtained similarly to the Hamming case by dividing the number of subspaces of dimension r of G F(q m ) containing a special subspace of dimension r by the total number of subspaces of dimension r . This probability p can be obtained by using the Gaussian binomial as:
using the traditional approximation for Gaussian binomials we obtain:
Hence if one takes r = (n−k)m n = m − km n one gets a probability that E is included in a random space E of dimension r , which is q −(m−r )r = q −r km n . If one also considers the complexity of the matrix inversion in the average case where the linear system has full rank, one gets the average complexity described in the proposition.
b) The Particular Case of Null Syndrome: In that case, following Section 3.2.1, the fact that the syndrome is zero, permits to deduce that for any non null α ∈ G F(q m ),
is also a support corresponding to the solution of the problem. This means in particular that we can always consider that E contains 1 (by multiplying by an adequate α). He approach works as previously at the difference that the dimension of the searched space is r − 1 rather than r , the probability to retrieve the space E in E is then q −(r−1) km n . When r is small, decreasing r by one may induced a real difference in the practical complexity of the attack. c) Improving the General Case by Considering the Search of an Element of a Code: We saw previously that the case of searching for a small weight codeword (the case where the syndrome is zero) permitted to decrease the dimension of the searched error support E by one. We want to extend this idea for the general case when the support s is non null. It is possible but in that case we have to increase k by one. The idea works as follows: one starts again, from the equation y = x G +e, we introduce a new (k +1)×n matrix G obtained from G by adding a last row y. Now e belongs to the code C generated by G , but more generally since C is a code over G F(q m ), for any α ∈ G F(q m ), the vector αe is also in G . The idea now is to fix a special value of α which will fix an element of the searched error space, it will decrease by 1 the number of basis element which are to be included in E . Then once the space α E is recovered, one recovers the α and the original E.
To go in more detail on this idea: we suppose without loss of generality that e 1 = 0, if one considers the subspace e −1 1 E it has still dimension r but contains the vector 1. One can apply the same method that previously but this time the code has dimension k + 1 and one knows an element of E. The number of syndrome equations over G F(q) is (n − k − 1)m. And hence the dimension r of E must satisfy: r ≤ (n−k−1)m n . Since one knows that 1 ∈ E, one just need that the remaining r − 1 elements of a basis of E are also in E , which gives a probability q −(r−1) (k+1)m n . Once we recover e −1 1 E, taking e −1 1 as unknown in syndrome equations permits to recover it easily at almost no cost. Overall if one adds the polynomial complexity one gets the second complexity of the proposition.
The details of the previous proof leads to: Corollary 7: With the same hypothesis than the previous theorem, the complexity of the error support attack for finding a codeword of rank r of rank code C[n, k] is on the average O((n − k − 1) 3 m 3 q (r−1) km n ). Remark 1 (Solutions of the Linear System): Since the matrix H , the syndrome s and the subspace E of given dimension r are considered random, solving the system induced over G F(q) from the system over G F(q m ) (considered as a G F(q)-vector space), corresponds in practice to solving a random system over G F(q) (this was observed in our computations). Hence there is the theoretical possibility that the system is not of full rank, and has a rank default l. In practice this is not important since the searched error vector is always solution to the system and since the number of potential false solutions depends on the rank default, which probability to be high is low since our system can be considered as random., moreover in the case there are false solutions, moreover it is easy to test these false solutions by considering the original syndrome equations. For practical examples, this case did not happen.
V. THE q -POLYNOMIALS AND ANNULATOR POLYNOMIAL SETTING
In this section, we introduce the algebraic material needed to present our new setting for algebraic cryptanalysis of rank syndrome decoding problems. We give a way to reduce a rank syndrome decoding to a polynomial system.
A. Background on q-Polynomials and Annulator Polynomials
The q-polynomials were first studied by Öre in [36] because of their deep links with finite fields structures and their surprising algebraic properties.
Definition 8: A q-polynomial of q-degree r in G F (q m ) is a polynomial of the form:
One can remark that for all x and y ∈ G F (q m ) and all α and β ∈ G F (q), we have:
We denote by G F (q m ) x q the set of q-polynomials. This set has a non-commutative ring structure with the following internal laws:
In [36] , Öre gives the main properties of this ring. This a noncommutative Euclidian ring (this implies that this is a principal ring).
Proposition 9: Let E be a subspace of G F (q m ), then,
The above proposition show that Ann (E) is a G F (q)-vector space. The following proposition give the main property of the of value where a q-polynomial vanishes.
Proposition 10: The roots of a q-polynomial of q-degree r over G F (q m ) form a G F (q)-subvector space of G F (q m ) of dimension at most r .
The two last proposition allow to easily establish the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Öre): For any subspace E of G F (q m ) of dimension r there exists a unique monic q-polynomial of q-degree r , such that:
It is the polynomial P (x) such that Ann (E) = (P) as a principal ideal.
This last proposition is the starting point of our cryptanalysis of the rank syndrome decoding problem. The existence of such a polynomial for the syndrome will give rise to a new kind of algebraic systems.
B. Annulator Based Setting for Rank Decoding
In this subsection, we give a new algebraic formulation of the syndrome rank decoding. Let C be a [n, k] be a random rank metric code over G F (q m ) with generator matrix G = g i, j of size k × n. We denote by G i the i th row of G. Assume that one receives y = m + e for m ∈ C and rank (e) = r . We denote E the vector space generated in G F (q m ) by the coordinates of e. Usual algebraic approach may consider (n + 1) r +k unknowns to describe algebraically this problem: r unknowns in G F (q m ) for to describe a basis of E, k unknowns in G F (q m ) for the coordinates c i of c and nk unknowns in G F (q) for the coordinates of the error in the basis of E. In the next paragraph, we introduce a new approach that consider only k + r unknowns, all in G F (q m ).
Since dim (E) = r , by proposition 11, there exists a unique monic q-polynomial of q-degree r , P(x) = r i=0 p i x q i (with p r = 1), which admits as annulator space the error y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) and e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ E, in a way that P y j − k i=1 c i g i, j = P e j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This gives us a system of k +r unknowns, the k coefficients c i of c and the r coefficients of P { p 0 , . . . , p r−1 }, and n equations. This setting has less unknowns than the previous settings since it take into account that the variable are in G F (q m ). The system is very structured and is linear on the coefficients of the q-polynomial P. Unfortunately, the monomials has shape p l c q l i and so they have very high degree (less or equal to q r + 1) but the system is very sparse since the possible degrees for variable c i are only the powers of q.
We are now interested in solving this algebraic system. In what follows, we will consider two ways to do so: linearization and solving using Gröbner basis. But, before to go further, we want to compare our setting to others arising in very closed problem.
VI. SOLVING BY LINEARIZATION
A. Basic Approach
We saw in previous section how the new setting could be described: let c = k i=1 c i G i , e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ). Since e has rank r , the subspace E generated by the e i has dimension r . By Proposition 7 there exists a unique monic annulator q-polynomial P(x) = r i=0 p i x q i with p r = 1 such that ∀z ∈ E, P(z) = 0. Hence we obtain:
which gives n equations in the k + r unknowns:
and p j (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1). A basic approach consists in counting the number of different monomials in the c i and the p j and independent unknowns and the number of equations, in our setting, although the degree of equation is very high it turns out that the equations are also very sparse so that there a not so many different monomials, it is possible to obtain the following result:
Theorem 12: Let C be a [n, k] random code over G F(q m ) with generator matrix G of size k ×n and suppose one receives y = c + e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r . If n ≥ (r + 1) (k + 1) − 1, the complexity of solving the rank decoding problem, assuming that the linearized system arising from (2) is of full rank, is polynomial in O(((r + 1)(k + 1) − 1) 3 ) operations in G F(q m ). Proof: The system we obtain from equation (2) is multivariate and polynomial of degree 2 in the unknowns c i and p i . Such a non linear system can be solved through Gröbner basis, but it is also possible to solve by linearization, indeed in this case by linearization we obtain (r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 terms: -k.r terms of the form : p j c q j i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1 -k terms of the form: c q r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (corresponding to the term p r = 1).
-r terms of the form : p j for 0 ≤ j ≤ p r−1 (corresponding to the scalar coordinates of y)
Hence overall (r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 linearized terms.
In the case where the number of equations n satisfy n ≥ (r +1)(k +1)−1, the problem with full rank can be solved with the complexity of solving a linear system over G F(q m ) with (r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 unknowns. It gives the wanted bound.
Remark 2: We have a linear system of n equations with (r +1)(k+1)−1 unknowns. Remark that the system always has a solution despite the fact it is over-constrained. The solution is unique as long as the system has full rank ((r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 equations are independent). The columns of the system are indexed by the monomials of the systems and columns with the same monomials correspond to coefficients arising from G applying a power of the Froebenius map, then a relation between columns of the system we consider may induce a relation on the columns of G by linearity and invertibility of the Froebenius and its powers. The system considered is generated from a random matrix G and has a special structure so that it is difficult to use theoretical results on random systems but in practice they behave as such. It is possible that the system of the proof of theorem 12 is not of full rank and that we have false solutions but in that case it is possible to sort them. Such unwanted solutions did not occur in practice for the examples we considered.
B. An Hybrid Advanced Approach
We saw how it was possible depending on conditions on n, k and r to solve directly the problem, now what happens if such a condition is not fulfilled ? We saw that in the basic linearization of the previous section, that the number of unknowns was quadratic in r and k. It is possible to decrease this number by guessing an error. Suppose indeed that an error e j is zero, recall that:
then if e j = 0 one obtains a linear equation in the c i , which permits to substitute one of the c i by a linear combination of the others in all rows equations of the code.
In particular it means that if one can find an error e j = 0, then one can decrease the number of c i by one and hence decrease the number of unknowns in the linearization by (r + 1) terms. Now since the error e i ∈ E of dimension r , for random e i the probability that e i = 0 is q −r .
This idea is precised in: Proposition 13: Let C be a [n, k] random code over G F(q m ) with generator matrix G of size k×n and suppose one receives y = c + e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r . If there exists an integer t ≤ k such that n−t ≥ (r +1)(k+1−t)−1 then, with the same assumption on the full rank of the arising linearized system than for Theorem 12, the complexity of solving the rank decoding problem has an average complexity bounded above by O((nkt + r 3 k 3 )q rt ) operations in G F(q m ).
Proof: In order to prove our result we first explain how it is possible to eliminate one unknown c i with probability q −r , then we explain how it is possible to repeat the process in order to eliminate t different unknowns among the k c i with probability q −rt .
Our algebraic setting y = cG + e gives n equations in c i and p j . Suppose that we know that for a given equation, the error e j is zero, then we obtain a linear equation ( k i=1 c i g i j ) with only unknowns the c i . Suppose without loss of generality that c 1 is written in terms of others unknowns c j ( j = 1), then substituting c 1 by a linear combination in the c j ( j = 1) in all remaining n − 1 equations given by the relation y = cG + e, gives a new system of equations, with n − 1 linear equations without c 1 . After this step we hence obtain one equation with all the c j and n − 1 equations without c 1 . Since the rank of the error e is still the same, we can still consider the action of the annulator polynomial of the error support and hence one can still use equation (2) of the previous section, but this time the number of unknowns c i has decreased by one. We hence obtain a new linearized system of equations with only (r +1)(k +1)−1−(r +1) terms since the number of unknowns c i (with i = 1) 'has decreased' by one. Now since we have used an equation to describe c 1 from the c i we have one less equation (which defines c 1 from other c j ), eventually after this step we are left with n − 1 independent equations without c 1 .
We hence saw how to it was possible to decrease by one the number of unknowns c i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) when a zero error coordinate e j was known. Now, all columns of the code permits to derive linear equations:
If one considers these n equations and consider new equations obtained by linear combinations of these equations in the small field G F(q), the obtained equations are still linear in the c j and since multiplication by an element of G F(q) does not change the error support, the error obtained in the new equations (the constant term not linked to the c j ) can be considered as a random element of E. Therefore we can deduce that the probability to obtain a zero error in the linear combination of these equations is 1 q r since there are only q r possible errors (the q r elements of the error support) and that by considering random linear combinations on the small field G F(q) of different error values of the support, all error values have the same probability to be obtained by the linear combination on the small field G F(q).
Repeating the process t times permits each time to decrease the number of linearized terms, described in the previous section, by r + 1 and reduces the number of equations to be used (ie: without the substituted c i ) by 1, overall since we want to guess t zero error coordinates and that each zero error has a probability q −r to happen, the overall probability of success is 1 q rt . The complexity of the attack has hence a probabilistic cost in q rt (the average number of trials before finding a zero error on t chosen coordinates) and a polynomial part. The polynomial part consists in searching new equations with error zero, this part is negligible since one can use a method where one modifies very few equations for each new trial. Once a potential zero is found, after finding i zeros, one has to write the c j in terms of c l for 1 ≤ l ≤ j − 1, and then modify the terms of each c l with the terms coming from c k . After t trials the cost is hence t i=1 (k − i )(n − i ). Then the last part is the solving of a linear system in G F(q m ) with
The first term can be bounded above by nkt and the second by (r + 1) 3 (k + 1) 3 , which gives the result. Proof: We apply the previous proposition: the condition t ≤ k such that n − t ≥ (r + 1)(k + 1 − t) − 1 gives t = (r+1)(k+1)−(n+1) r . In the complexity since in general for practical parameters t n we neglect the part in nkt.
Remark 3: The condition of the previous corollary is always satisfied for common parameters since asymptotically it means k + r < n. Asymptotically the previous attack leads to an exponential term in rk + r − n, when the Ourivki-Johansson attack has an exponential term in rk − k + r . Therefore our attack has a gain in n − 2k in the exponent and is better when n − 2k is positive, which is especially the case for small k.
VII. SOLVING WITH GRÖBNER BASIS
A. Solving Polynomial Systems (Gröbner Basis Approach)
The notion of Gröbner basis is linked to the one of monomial term ordering. A monomial order is an order on monomials which is compatible with the product in order to have a pseudo-division with respect to such an order. Roughly speaking, a Gröbner basis G = {g 1 , . . . , g s } of the ideal generated by a set of polynomials f 1 , . . . , f n is a family such that, for each h ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x u ], then remainder of the pseudo-division of h with respect to G is 0 if and only if h lies in the ideal ( f 1 , . . . , f n ).
The lexicographical orders are particularly interesting since the shape of the Gröbner basis for such an order is the following: 1 (x 1 , . . . , x u 
This structure allows to solve the original system (it is a type of triangular system). It was the initial motivation to the research of more efficient algorithms to compute Gröbner bases. Generally, computing a Gröbner basis for a lexicographical order is harder than computing one for graded ordering. But once you know a Gröbner basis for a graded order you can use the FGLM algorithm (see [15] ) to have one for lexicographical order or use solver that use directly the structure of the pseudo-division by Gröbner basis with respect to graded order.
The more efficient algorithm to compute Gröbner basis is the F 5 algorithm of Faugère [16] , but experiments realized in this work were made using the F 4 algorithm in MAGMA [12] . Here, we give complexity results using the F 5 algorithm even if we used the F 4 algorithm since the use of F 5 algorithm has been carefully studied for cryptography. An important quantity for Gröbner basis computation of a ideal is the regularity of the generating system, denoted d reg , defining the ideal. The number d reg is the biggest degree reach in the Gröbner basis computation by the F 5 algorithm. In [1] , the authors give a way to bound the complexity of the algorithm with respect to the regularity of the system:
Proposition 15: The complexity of computing Gröbner basis of a zero-dimensional system of n equations in u variables using the F 5 algorithm is:
where d reg is the degree of regularity of the system and 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3 is the linear algebra constant.
B. Gröbner Bases for RSD
We will now use this technical background to study the original system, denoting p = ( p 0 , . . . , p r−1 ) and c = (c 1 , .., c k ):
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Complexity Issues of Our Method: The use of Gröbner bases is very important when n < (r + 1)(k + 1) − 1, possibly combined with guessing of some variables for an hybrid approach (see below for a presentation of the hybrid approach). Here, instead of (r +1)(k+1) variables of the linear attack, we have r +k variables (k unknowns for the coefficients of the rows of the code and r unknowns from the annulator polynomial-assuming this polynomial is monic).
The system has a suitable structure (sparse or semi-sparse and algebraically structured). We will bound the complexity of the regularity for our system by a semi-regular one with a same degree sequence. If we denote by M d (u) the set of monomial of degree d in u variables, we have #M d (u) = u+d−1 d . Following [16] , the complexity to compute a Gröbner basis of an ideal of degree if regularity d reg in a ring of polynomial of u variables with the F 5 algorithm is O #M d reg (u) ω .
Remark that all the equations have degree q r + 1 in a way that d reg is the first non positive coefficient of
we have that d reg is the first non positive coefficient of:
For k + r variables, n equations of degree q r + 1, we obtain a complexity in O n (k+r)+d reg d reg . We used the package described in [11] to compute the regularity of some generic problems with the same degree (and one can deduce a close formula for d reg from the above computation). The sparseness of the system makes the theoretical complexity evaluation very pessimistic for practical achievement. For instance, for the case where q = 2 24 , k = 12, r = 6 (i.e. equations have degree 2 6 + 1) and n = 64, we have a regularity of 200 and a complexity bounded above by 2 152 ! But the running time to solve using F 4 in MAGMA is only few hours (and we can take advantage of the hybrid approach in order to improve the approach). It appears, experimentally, that the equations appearing in the computations are very very sparse and remain sparse. When the number of equations decreases, the algorithm destroys quickly the sparse structure. So, the theoretical bound has generally no meaning by itself, but it reveals some structural properties of the formulation. Experimentally, the running time of the algorithm behaves as if we replace the degrees of the equations by their q-degree (here the degree is q r and the q-degree is r ). In the previous example, instead of a complexity of 2 152 with the degree, the complexity with q-degree is 2 55 and the algorithm effectively runs within few hours. This remark is always valid in example as long as n > r + k. This gives a range of parameters for which the Gröbner bases approach improves the linearization. Furthermore, the hybrid approach extends naturally this approach as we will see below.
1) Comparison With Other Approaches: Other approaches, introduced in the context of cryptanalysis of systems based on MinRank problem can be extended to the RSD problem and reduce the considered problems to PoSSo problem just as we did in the previous paragraphs. We will show that our approach is of particular interest compare to those ones. The two methods has in common to get back to the linear algebra formulation and so, they work on the field G F(q). We do not introduce here MinRank problem, we only adapt the attack to RSD. To do this, we use the reduction introduced in [17] to transform in poly-time a rank decoding problem to a MinRank problem. We also use the bounds given in [17] since, those authors give finer result in [18] and [19] , but algorithm in [19] works only for square matrices (which is generally not true in our cases) and in [18] the algorithm is probabilistic and the complexity is not improved drastically.
Using the reduction of [17] , we reduce a RSD problem on G F(q m ) with parameters k for the dimension of the code, n for it size and r for the error rank to a MinRang problem of parameters m (number of rows of the matrices), n (number of column of the matrices), r (rank) and km (number of matrices). The method was developed only for square matrices, but it is possible to extend it to rectangular matrices. Using the theoretical bound of [19] , the Kipnis-Shamir approach apply to a RSD problem of parameters n, k, r leads, when the generated MinRank problem is square, to an algorithm with complexity O km+r(n−r)+d reg d reg ω (ω still denotes the linear algebra constant) and with d reg ≤ 1 + mi n{km, (n − r )r }).
Here, the number of variables depends of n and m in contrary to our approach and is the bound seem also very pessimistic. Finally, the minors approach apply to a RSD problem of parameters n, k, r needs O km+r(n−r)+1 r(n−r)+1 operations over G F(q) with some more restrictive conditions. So, even if it is possible to give bounds for this approach, the number of variable highly depend on the dimension m of the field G F(q m ) over G F(q) and of the number of equations n in the exponent. Our approach, staying in G F(q m ), avoid the parameter m in the combinatorial factor (it is on the constant for the complexity of the basic operations on G F(q m )).
C. Hybrid Approach
Just as for the advance linearization attack, it is possible to make an hybrid approach making some guess on the values of some variables c i . Since the number of variables for the Gröbner bases approach is k + r each time we find a c i , we reduce the number of variables of 1. Furthermore, we reduce the number of variables without decreasing the number of equations. It is to say that making guesses on several variables improves the ratio of the number of equations over the number of variables. We use this in order to define an heuristic: try to guess sufficiently many c i to be able to check, in a fast way, that the generated system is not coherent. There is trade off between the number t of c i we try to guess (it gives a q t factor to the complexity and decrease the probability of success) and the speed of checking if the system is not coherent.
VIII. CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME CRYPTOSYSTEMS
In this section we apply our results in a cryptanalysis context. We first recall basic facts about the attack on the GPT cryptosystem then we show how our new attack can break all proposed parameters for the reparation of the scheme.
A. The GPT Rank-Based Cryptosystem
The GPT cryptosystem is similar to the McEliece cryptosystem but works for rank distance. The Gabidulin codes are the equivalent of the Reed-Solomon codes for rank metric. The main problem in the cryptosystem consists in finding a way to hide the decoding matrix. For Hamming distance it is done through a permutation matrix. In the case of Gabidulin codes, several approaches have been proposed by adding words of small rank, by adding a scrambling matrix, introducing a new class of codes: the Rank reducible codes etc... All these systems lead to interesting parameters. There are two ways to attack such systems: a first way is structural and the attacker tries to recover the mask (or the hiding procedure) from the public key, based on the structural properties of the Gabidulin codes. In 2005 Overbeck [38] proposed a structural attack which broke many proposed parameters. After this attack some new parameters have been proposed which resist to this attack. We show in the following that these parameters are not secure either, meanwhile at the difference of Overbeck's attack, our attack is not structural but completely generic and depends only on code parameters.
B. Applications to Cryptanalysis of Some Proposed Parameters and General Comparison of Different Existing Attacks
In the following we apply our method on different reparation of GPT cryptosystem. Since the Basis enumeration and the Ourivski-Johansson attack were well known people proposed new variations which focused on resisting to Overbeck attack, since in general it was rather easy to resist to the Basis and Coordinate enumeration attacks.
Several approaches have been proposed to resist Overbeck's attack [23] , [32] , [40] [41] [42] , but only two papers propose published parameters: an approach by Loidreau in [32] and an approach by Gabidulin, Rashwan and Honary ( [40] , [42] ). In the following we show that all the proposed parameters in these papers are completely broken and can be practically recovered, even in less than 1s sometimes.
In the following we attack the RSD problem for [n, k] codes for an error of rank r , q = 2 and an extension of size 2 m . In the following tables we give the different complexity of the different attack regarding the code used. Notice that our attacks are not structural attacks since we do not use any particular structure of the code. In the tables: 'OJ1' stands for the improved basis enumeration by Ourivski and Johansson, 'OJ2' stands for coordinates enumeration, 'Over' stands for the complexity of the Overbeck attack, 'ES' stands for the complexity of the Error Support attack of Section 3, 'LH' stands for the complexity of the attack by hybrid linearization when guessing zero coordinates errors and 'HGb' is the complexity (usually in time) when one attacks with hybrid solving with Gröbner basis in our new setting. We did not put the complexity with simple Gröbner basis since it usually does not finish. All our computations were done with the F4 version of Magma on a double core of a 2GHz INTEL with 8 Go RAM.
We now consider the different type of reparations.
• Loidreau reparation [32]
The idea of the reparation is to add sufficiently many columns so that the Overbeck attack does not work. The author focus on the complexity of the Overbeck attack since there is no difficulty to resist other attacks since in previous complexity, the length n of the code did not appeared in the exponential complexity of the attack. The author starts from a [24, 12, 12] Gabidulin code which can correct 6 errors and proposes two sets of parameters for which he adds 40 random columns or 52 random columns. Table 1 gives the different complexities for our attacks.
Some Details on the Attacks: let us first consider the first set of parameters (64, 12, 6, 24) . In that case Theorem 12 implies that it is possible to recover by linearization a word of rank r when the number of equations is greater than (r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 = 90 = L B, let us call this number the linearization bound. In practice if we use the F4 algorithm, empirical results show that for this type of parameters it is possible to find a solution, for a reasonable time, with only L B − k = 78 equations. For the system we attack, we have only 64 equations, hence we consider an hybrid approach and try to guess 3 errors values to 0 in order to decrease the number of unknowns. The probability to find a null error is 2 −6 since r = 6. Now each time we guess a null error, we can find a linear relation between the c i , the coefficients of the searched codeword, so that it is equivalent to decreasing the number of rows in the code by 1. It also decreases the number of equations by 1. Suppose now that we found 3 such null errors (with average probability 2 17 ), the number of equations becomes 61, the number of rows becomes k − 3 = 9, and the linearization bound becomes 69 and Grobner bases can solve with 69 − 9 = 60 equations. In practice if the guessing was wrong a failure was obtained with F4 in an average time of 0.13 s (finding a failure for Gröbner bases is faster than recovering the whole solution), repeating the process on a 4 processors computer permitted us to retrieve the solution in 2h. We also run in practice the LH attack which had a complexity in 2 48 field operations, we run the attack in Magma and overall the HGb attack was far more efficient and faster than the attack with Gröbner bases.
For the second set of parameters (76, 12, 6, 24) the number of equations is 76 rather than 64, so that it is sufficient to guess only one error with average probability 2 −5 . Since we only decrease the number of rows by one, the Grobner bases process is faster compared to the previous case, in that case, a failure for Gröbner bases is obtained in 0.01s and the overall time is less than 1s.
Our attacks, therefore show that all parameters proposed [32] are completely broken.
• Cryptanalysis of Gabidulin et al. reparations [40] , [42] In [40] and [42] , Gabidulin et al. propose an approach and parameters (claimed with security 2 80 ) to resist Overbeck's attack, the approach called 'advanced approach for standard variant' proceeds by hiding as usual the generator matrix G with a matrix M with a special form, overall the proposed parameters can be attacked directly by decoding an error e of rank r in a [n, k] code over G F (2 m ). We give in Table  2 the different code parameters proposed and the complexity, the two first set of parameters are from [40] and the two last ones are from [42] corresponding to a public key of size 4000 bits.
Experimental results show that it was possible to recover the message in 2 and 5 days with an hybrid Gröbner bases attack for the first and third set of parameters. In particular it shows that parameters proposed in [42] with a public key of 4000 bits are clearly unsafe. For the second and fourth case the computation could not finish with hybrid Gröbner bases meanwhile the hybrid linearization attack (without Gröbner bases) gives attack complexities of order 2 60 which implies that these parameters can also be considered broken. Practical computation were done which shows that in practice the time estimation of the complexity followed these complexities. The table shows that in fact these parameters were badly chosen since they were already attacked by OJ1 and OJ2, meanwhile our attacks are even better on these parameters and permits in some case to obtain a practical cryptanalysis.
C. A General View on the Different Attacks 1) Discussion on Attacks for Practical Parameters:
The rank metric is a very structured metric which gives rise to different type of generic attacks, it is hence sometimes difficult to have a general picture on the different type of attacks which are the most efficient. In fact the most efficient attacks depend on the type of parameters considered. a) Comments on combinatorial attacks: When q is small, typically, q = 2, the most efficient attacks are usually combinatorial attacks, and if n > m, the best attacks are the attacks described in this paper. For instance the parameters of Loidreau broken in the previous section, are a typical example of parameters for which the Error Support attack described in this paper is fully efficient. Combinatorial attacks begin to be less interesting when q increases, indeed in that case the complexity of combinatorial attacks grows exponentially with q, since their complexity is of the form q O(n 2 ) . When m ≥ n the best attack remains the attack by Ourivski and Johansson [37] . b) Comments on algebraic attacks: The main interest of algebraic attacks is that typically their complexity only depends on the base field G F(q), polynomially in q (the cost of a multiplication in the base field G F(q), so that when q increases, the complexity of these attacks, like for instance the Levy-Perret attack, increases only with a polynomial factor, which means that at some point when q increases, this type of attack becomes more efficient than combinatorial attacks, which depend on q with a logarithmic factor in the exponent. For intermediate values of q it may depend. Meanwhile the drawback of algebraic attacks is that they depend on the number of unknowns, which is directly related to m, and for large m the complexity grows very quickly. The most efficient algebraic attack for moderate value of the rank r of the error seems to be the Levy-Perret attack, the kernel attacks and the minor attacks are especially efficient for large value of r (close to n) since their complexity is exponential in (n − r ) 2 .
c) Comments on the annulator attack: When the annulator polynomial attack described in this paper works, it does not depend neither on q neither on m, meanwhile this attack works for rather small r , so that the linearity bound (r + 1).(k + 1) − 1 (for which one can solve by linearization when n is greater than this) is not too far from the length n. In practice, since parameters for rank metric are rather small in general (compared for instance with parameters for codes with Hamming distance), this attack is often very efficient for small q since it is possible to have the hybrid approach which permits to reach the linearity bound by guessing errors. At last the annulator attack when it is used with Grobner basis, seems to be a little more efficient in practice (from what we saw on examples) than the direct hybrid linearization attack, meanwhile the complexity seems difficult to evaluate. Anyway this attack is probably at its best for parameters, not too far from the linearity bound, in other words: when (r + 1).(k + 1) − 1 − n is not too big.
Overall even if one can deduce from this discussion, the main type of parameters for which the different attacks are naturally the most efficient, there may always be intermediate values of parameters for which two given attacks could have narrow complexities and hence should be compared more precisely. Eventually the attacks described in this paper are particularly interesting to consider for practical cryptographic parameters.
2) An Informal Discussion on the Asymptotic Behavior of the Complexity of Attacks for Rank Metric: It may be of interest to try to have an idea of the behavior of different attack on an asymptotic point of view. For instance consider the case where m = n, k = n/2, and r on the rank Gilbert-Varshamov bound, which is of order n/3 and suppose we increase n. In that case the only two relevant attacks are the combinatorial attacks which has an exponent of order n 2 /6 (more generally in O(n 2 )) on one side, and on the other side, the Levy-Perret attack gives about n 2 equations for about 2/3n 2 unknowns, so that by a Bezout-type bound the complexity is bounded above by an exponential term with an exponent also in O(n 2 ).
It is hence interesting to remark that best known attacks for problem based on rank distance for fixed rate and a rank linear in the length n, have an exponential asymptotic complexity with a quadratic term in n in the exponent. Since the size of the matrices are in O(n 3 ) (a (k × n) matrix plus the fact that elements are in G F(q m )), it means that having a security in 2 O(n) implies a whole size O(n 3 2 ) for the description of the rank code. If we compare with Hamming distance, for a reference parameter n (the length of the code) the matrix description is in O(n 2 ) but the asymptotic complexity is in 2 O(n) with best known attacks, which means that a description of a code has size O(n 2 ) to obtain a security in 2 O(n) . This informal discussion shows that there are reasons for which at a given security level, one gets smaller size of parameters for rank distance rather than for Hamming distance for random instance of problems. This point is of particular interest, since it means that for rank metric it is possible to obtain for a computational security of 2 80 (say), parameters of code with size of only a few thousand bits corresponding to random instances of a problem with a proven hardness, when for Hamming codes or lattices such parameters would be of at least a few hundred thousand bits. Of course for codes and lattices, it is possible to add an additional structure (like cyclicity) in order to decrease the size of parameters, but then the security reduction is lost.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we give two new generic attacks for the RSD problem, the first one, the Support attack generalizes in a natural way to the rank metric, the classical information set decoding approach for Hamming distance. In particular this attacks permits to take account of the length of the code in the exponential term of the complexity, which was not the case before. The second attack, the polynomial annulator attack, is an algebraic attack which uses results on q-polynomials by Ore. The attack provides a new algebraic setting for attacking the RSD problem. This attack is specially efficient when the rank metric weight of the error is not too high, which is often the case in a rank metric context (compared to Hamming distance for instance). Our two new attacks break all published sets of parameters which repair the GPT cryptosystem after the Overbeck attack.
Overall the results we give here can be seen as a way to better understand the practical hardness of the RSD problem. This metric remains a very interesting tool for cryptography, in the way that all known attack have a quadratic complexity in the exponential term, which means that at the difference of Hamming distance, it is possible to obtain very low size public keys for a whole generator matrix, for suitable security parameters. In some sense there is an inherent complexity in the rank metric compared to the Hamming distance, indeed for evaluating the practical complexity of the syndrome decoding problem for Hamming distance, the basic tool is the Newton binomial coefficient which corresponds to counting the number of words of weight t for a length n vector, (value which bounded above by 2 n ), when for rank metric the equivalent tool is the Gaussian binomial coefficient, which counts the number of subspace of dimension r in a vector space of dimension n, but this coefficient grows much faster than the Newton binomial coefficients, with an exponential term depending on the product of r and n.
In practice our results show that it should be doable to consider new parameters for the reparations of the GPT cryptosystems but with larger public keys. Another interesting recent development is the introduction of LRPC codes [26] for rank metric, these codes are an equivalent of LDPC codes for rank metric, and seems provide very low size of public with a rather low structure, not based on Gabidulin codes.
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